The Efficiencies Defence in Merger Analysis: A New Zealand Perspective by Berry, Mark & Pickford, Mike
The Efficiencies Defence in Merger Analysis:
A New Zealand Perspective
Dr Mark Berry
Deputy Chair, Commerce Commission
Research Principal, ISCR
And
Dr Michael Pickford
Chief Economist, Commerce Commission
The Efficiencies Defence in Merger Analysis:
A New Zealand Perspective
Mark Berry and Michael Pickford
New Zealand’s current competition laws, like Canada’s, are comparatively new.  The
Commerce Act (the “Act”) and Canada’s Competition Act were both passed in 1986.
The New Zealand Act, in essence, recognises the efficiencies defence.  Where a
merger is likely to result in the acquisition of a dominant position in a market, it is
open to the merger parties to apply to the Commerce Commission (the
“Commission”) under section 67 for authorisation prior to implementation.  This
process requires the Commission to identify and weigh the detriments likely to flow
from the acquiring of a dominant position in the relevant markets, and to balance
those against the public benefits likely to flow from the acquisition as a whole.  Since
1990, there has been explicit statutory guidance under section 3A that efficiencies
must be taken into account in assessing public benefits.  If the Commission is satisfied
that the benefits outweigh the detriments, the proposed merger will be authorised.
Thus, there are striking similarities between the New Zealand position, section 96 of
the Canadian Competition Act and the US governmental guidelines described in
Professor Mathewson’s paper.1  What follows is an outline of the Commission’s
                                                
1 See paper entitled The Efficiencies Defense in Merger Analysis in Canada and the USA by Frank Mathewson, Professor
(Economics), Director of the Institute for Policy Analysis (University of Toronto), and Senior Consultant, Charles River
Associates, available on ISCR website.
approach in New Zealand.  This outline reflects a more tolerant approach than is
apparently the case in Canada.  Indeed, seven mergers raising dominance concerns
have already been authorised on public benefit grounds.
The Commission considers that a public benefit is any gain, and a detriment is any
loss, to the public of New Zealand, with an emphasis on gains and losses being
measured in terms of economic efficiency.  The formerly contentious issue in the
early 1990s of how changes in the distribution of income were to be treated has been
resolved in favour of neutrality, so that situations where one group gains while
another simultaneously loses are viewed as not being directly irrelevant in the
efficiency framework.  However, it is recognised that income transfers do provide
margins which could be absorbed by the production inefficiencies discussed below.
For example, these could provide a wide scope for rent-seeking behaviour by
managers and others in the merged entity, leading to the dissipation of rents through
inflated costs.  Similarly, because of the New Zealand focus required by the Act,
profits repatriated overseas (less local taxes paid) are apt to be regarded as a welfare
loss unless it leads to subsequent actions by those investors which would advantage
New Zealand public benefit.
Since the Air New Zealand/Ansett decision of 1996 the Commission, mindful of the
observations of Richardson J in Telecom v Commerce Commission on the
Commission’s responsibility to attempt to quantify benefits and detriments where
feasible, has attempted to do so rather than rely on purely intuitive judgement.
                                                                                                                                           
Critical to the assessment of benefits and detriments is the establishment of an
appropriate counterfactual.  This specifies what might otherwise happen in the future
in the absence of the acquisition.  Thus, a comparison has to be made between two
hypothetical future situations, one with the acquisition and one without.  The
differences between these two scenarios can then be attributed to the impact of the
acquisition in question.  This provides one mechanism for helping to ensure that the
benefits claimed are intrinsic to the acquisition, and could not be gained by any other
means.  The counterfactual is not necessarily a continuation of the status quo, as the
industry and relevant markets may continue to evolve in the absence of the
acquisition.  In framing a suitable counterfactual, the Commission bases its view on a
pragmatic and commercial assessment of what is likely to occur in the absence of the
acquisition.
In all cases, because of the uncertainties involved in making future predictions, the
emphasis is on establishing a range within which each of the detriment and benefit
categories in annual terms are likely to fall, and the greater the uncertainty faced, the
wider the ranges used.  The Commissioners are then left ultimately to determine
where in those ranges they believe the actual outcome will lie, and thus to make their
authorisation determination accordingly.  Time scales of up to five years ahead have
been used.  Applicants’ claims for benefits often step upwards for a few years
following the merger; the Commission has tended to assume that detriments follow
similar trends, as it is expected that inefficiencies may take some time to take hold.
In assessing the magnitude of the potential detriments, the Commission normally
conducts its analysis under three headings: allocative inefficiency, productive
inefficiency and dynamic inefficiency. With regard to allocative efficiency, the aim is
to quantify the size of this “deadweight loss triangle”, which depends upon estimates
of the price elasticity of market demand and of supply (i.e., the responsiveness of the
buyer and of suppliers respectively to changes in price); the anticipated size of the
price rise post-acquisition; and the size of the market measured by the total outlay.
The estimates used are intended to reflect the structure of the market in question as far
as information permits.  For example, in some cases econometric estimates of demand
elasticity may be available, but in others reliance may have to be placed on “educated
assessments” based on an appraisal of the economic characteristics of the product.
Applicants often argue for an inelastic demand as this serves to reduce the size of the
loss.  However, the nature of the triangle is such that the allocative loss rarely
contributes much to the overall size of the detriment.
Productive inefficiency is considered likely to arise when a firm acquires a dominant
position in a market because it lacks the competitive pressures to remain efficient in
production, even when it is a profit-seeking entity.  Organisational slack may creep
into its operations, salaries and benefits of management staff may become inflated,
and costs in general may increase, because a satisfactory level of profit is assured
even when the firm is less than fully efficient.  Principal-agent problems, in which
principals can neither fully control nor monitor their subordinates, may allow middle
managers scope for opportunistic or self-serving behaviour.  The increase in costs is a
measure of the value of the resources being wasted, which in turn indicates the value
of the output foregone by the economy as a whole from those resources not being
employed productively elsewhere.
In assessing such potential losses, the Commission focuses upon those costs of the
merged entity which are likely to be susceptible to inefficiency.  For example, the
costs of bought-in raw materials are much less likely to be affected by market power
than those related to its own manufacturing and distribution operations.  The
Commission broadly proceeds by applying different ranges of percentage increases to
different cost categories which reflect their assessed susceptibility to cost inflation.
Maximum percentage increases of up to ten per cent have been used, which seem
conservative in the light of overseas evidence, although perhaps not over the
relatively short to medium time frames used by the Commission.  Applicants often
argue various reasons why there industry would be less prone to productive
inefficiency, such as an export orientation, the constraints posed by a co-operative
form of organisation, or peripheral competition from other products which are not
quite close enough substitutes to be included in the original market definition.
Dynamic efficiency is concerned with the speed with which an industry adopts
superior new technology and produces improved new products, the first through
advances in productivity allowing costs of supply to be reduced, and the second
bringing the benefit of meeting buyer wants more fully.  In broad terms, product
innovation would be reflected in a rightward shift of the demand curve, indicating a
buyer switch to the improved products of the innovating company or industry, whilst
the lower costs associated with production innovation would be revealed by a
downward shift in the supply (or unit cost) curve.
Competition is generally considered to act as a stimulus to dynamic efficiency, and
market power as a retardant.  It is generally believed that in an industry which has a
significant scope for technological advance, the potential losses associated with
market power are likely to be greater in the longer term in respect of dynamic
inefficiency than they are in respect of the static (allocative and productive) forms of
inefficiency.  This is because of the loss of the compounding effect of the
improvements over time.
In assessing the possible losses from reduced dynamic efficiency, the Commission
takes into account the degree of intrinsic dynamism in the industry as a whole, both in
terms of advances in technology and in products; the sources of that dynamism
(whether internally or externally generated); and indicators such as the frequency of
product innovation and the level of research intensity (sums spent on research and
development).  These have to be put in the New Zealand context where R&D
spending appears to be relatively low by international standards.  The Commission,
although recognising that such predictions are notoriously difficult to make, and
hence a relatively wide range in the possible outcomes is necessary, has attempted to
estimate possible losses of dynamic efficiency with respect to both a decline in
product and production innovation.  The latter is generally measured as a loss of
productivity growth which would have reduced unit cost by a given (small) annual
percentage amount.
The onus is upon the applicants to establish that their proposed acquisitions will
generate a net public benefit, and hence much space in applications is generally
devoted to laying out benefit claims, usually supported by the work of independent
economic experts.  One suspects that a variety of factors are at work: the pressure on
applicants to prove benefits; the fact that even they – for all their knowledge of their
business - lack a perfect crystal ball; and a natural tendency to over-state in the
expectation that over-exuberant claims are likely to be pegged back.  Hence, a
reasonable expectation is that benefit claims are likely to be over-stated, the
difficulties of obtaining them understated, and the scope for making similar gains in
the absence of the proposal ignored.  While this may have happened to some extent in
the past, some more recent applications appear if anything to have moved in the
opposite direction, putting forward allegedly “conservative” estimates of benefits.
Nonetheless, the Commission has always taken a sceptical stance towards benefit
claims, such that to be acceptable, claims must be plausible and generally supported
by quite detailed evidence.
It is here in particular that substantial and knowledgeable opponents of the acquisition
can play an important role in testing the robustness of the applicant’s benefit claims, a
role which has to be fulfilled in their absence by Commission staff.  This is because
many claimed benefits require a detailed knowledge of a firm’s operations which are
not readily grasped by outside observers.  However, a problem with the dominance
threshold in the Act is that an acquisition leading to dominance is likely to leave few,
if any, competitors of any size in the market who could act as opponents.  Exceptions
may occur where the market is a regional geographic one with opponents operating in
other geographic markets, or where an acquisition has both domestic and international
implications, with overseas companies potentially able and interested in fulfilling the
“complaining rival” role.
While the Commission is prepared to entertain a wide variety of benefit claims, a
critical issue with benefits is that there has to be a nexus between those claimed and
the proposed merger.  The Commission has expressed scepticism where substantial
benefits are claimed to appear immediately, when it is evident that they could only be
achieved gradually and at some cost and effort. Claimed benefits often overlook the
difficulties that many mergers experience in trying to integrate the disparate activities
of two firms with different cultures, especially where one firm is being acquired rather
than being an equal merger partner.  There may be too many issues for management
to deal with simultaneously.  Also, the benefits must be ‘real’ rather than ‘pecuniary’
ones, that is, they must lead to savings in inputs used, rather than merely reflect the
superior buying power of the merged entity.
In some instances, benefits may be claimed where detriments have been found, such
as in dynamic efficiency and research and development.  This is part of a wider issue
raised by the implementation of the authorisation process, namely the potential
consistency issue between the accepting of claimed efficiency gains on the one hand,
and the expectation of efficiency detriments on the other.  If the latter arise through
organisational slack, should this be taken to reflect poorly on the entity’s ability to
realise claimed efficiency gains?  Each component of benefit and detriment tends to
be treated separately, rather than within the context of an overall ‘market model’
which might allow the varying cost and price effects to be integrated within a
consistent whole.  However, this would probably too difficult to do given the time and
information limitation on the process.
The above outline reflects the significant complexities and uncertainties which
surround the application of an efficiencies defence.  Nonetheless, in accordance with
the spirit of the Act, authorisation of an otherwise unlawful merger on efficiency
grounds is a distinct possibility in New Zealand.
